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I.

INTRODUCTION

E v e r e t t Thomas, the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , submits this
Brief in rep 1 y t• :> 1 1 1 e Brief si ibn Li t1ed by 11: ie Board of
E d u c a t i o n of the San Juan School District, the d e f e n d a n t appellee .
M r . Thomas stands by his legal analysis, and its
a p p l i c a t i o n to the instant d i s p u t e , that is set forth in his
Opening B r i e f .

He seeks to refrain from unnecessarily

repeating the arguments, r e g a r d i n g the correctness of v/hich he
remai ns confi dei 11

that appear ii i that Brief.
Ii

A.

ARGUMENT

T H E SChwOi, DISTRICT
E R R O N E O U S L Y SEEKS TO HAVE THE
C O U R T FOCUS ITS A T T E N T I O N ONLY ON W H A T HAPPENED A T
T H E S7LME OF ThF ACCIDF

E " r c • i i: i :i t s , .. a -...-..

I • B :i

• r e s e n t e • :I : i i. a p pea 1

forward, and throughout its Brief, the Board of Education of
t h e S a n J u a r i S c I i c :> 1 D i s t r i • : t: ( 11 I = D :i s t r :i :: t ) s e = k s t: : k 3 e p
the C o u r t ' s attention focused, only on what happened at the end
of the chain of events that 1 ed to Mr. "T1 Iomas' s severe 1: uri I
injuries.

It is important, h o w e v e r , to the Court/s

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 11 Ie relevant factual history and the Cour t s
a p p l i c a t i o n of correct legal a n a l y s i s , for the Court to keep
in m i n d that there is' a clear causal chain, at least as a
m a t t e r of triable fact, that begins with the failure of the

1

District to keep the subject Suburban in good operating
condition and to send it out on the highways of the State of
Utah in the condition it was in (including a situation in
which it was not only possible but likely, to the knowledge of
District maintenance personnel (see, e.g.,

Haws deposition at

40-41; 59 (R. at 204-05; 208); and Sanders deposition at 13;
28; 36 (R. at 215; 218; 220)), that the vehicle would "vapor
lock," again, on the subject trip.

It is understandable, from

an adversarial perspective, that the District wants to deflect
the Court's attention from the big picture of what occurred
and to have the Court focus only on the last event in the
chain (that is, Mr. Thomas's selfless, if unwise, effort to
get the engine started and get the school children on their
way).

Relevant tort histories hardly ever, however, occur in

an instant of time.

There is usually a series of significant

events leading up to the occurrence of an incident that gives
rise to the filing of a tort lawsuit, and this situation is no
exception to that rule.
As explained in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief, at 9-10, it
is settled Utah law that negligence and proximate cause
questions are almost always for the jury.

In this case, where

even the District's non-Robin Benallie agents (who were not,
like Ms. Benallie (see discussion in following Point B) at the

2

scene) acknowledged that it was foreseeable that a person
would do what Mr. Thomas did in the accident scene
circumstances (see, e.g.,

Sanders depo. at 36; 38-39; 45-47

(R. at 220-21; 223)), the foreseeability element of negligence
duty law is established.

Unlike some "public duty" cases, it

is clear that only a small number of persons would be in
harm's way when the District's negligent failure to maintain
the vehicle came to roost.

There is no reason to think that

Mr. Thomas would have been imperiled if the District had
properly maintained its vehicle, triable questions on
proximate cause, as well as negligence, clearly exist, and
this Court should reverse the District Court's granting of
summary judgment.
B.

THE DISTRICT HAS GLOSSED OVER THE FACT, WITH RESPECT
TO THE FORESEEABILITY ISSUE, THAT ROBIN BENALLIE, A
DISTRICT EMPLOYEE, WAS PRESENT WHEN THE FIRE
OCCURRED.

As explained in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief, in note 1, at
12-13, the District: Court most curiously ruled that it was not
foreseeable to the District that Mr. Thomas would do what he
did.

That ruling, set forth in the District Court's Ruling an

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 269-71), and
restated in the District Court's Order on Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. at 272-75), not only flies in the
face of the testimony of District employee Sanders (R. at 220-
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21; 223) regarding foreseeability.

It also, in apparent

disregard of hornbook agency principles that the knowledge of
an agent will be imputed to the principal, ignores the fact
that the final link of the relevant chain of events occurred
right under the nose of Robin Benallie, a District employee.
And, as pointed out in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief at 6,
Ms. Benallie acknowledged, in her deposition at 67-68 (R. at
233), that she knew that what Mr. Thomas was doing was
dangerous.1

The District Court's conclusion, in light of these

record facts, which were brought to the District Court's
attention in the course of the summary judgment proceedings,
that what Mr. Thomas did was not foreseeable is difficult to
comprehend.

It was not only foreseeable to the District

through its non-Benallie agents.

It was known to the

District, as a matter of fact, through Ms. Benallie, that
Mr. Thomas was doing exactly what he was doing.

I

Mr. Thomas feels constrained to reply to the suggestion, appearing at 9II of the District's Brief, that Ms. Benallie took any action to stop
Mr. Thomas from what he was doing. First, Ms. Benallie's testimony that
she told Mr. Thomas that "they told me to leave it alone" does not equate,
especially when she stood mute thereafter, with her telling Mr. Thomas to
leave the Suburban alone. Second, there is record evidence, from paragraph
12 of the Affidavit of Starr Ebert (R. at 257), and from the deposition
testimony of Everett Thomas (R. at 244) that, respectively, Ms. Benallie
did nothing to try to stop Mr. Thomas from what he was doing, and said
nothing to Mr. Thomas about leaving the vehicle alone or even about any
instructions she'd received from other District personnel.

4

C.

THE "PUBLIC DUTY" DOCTRINE IS OF NO ASSISTANCE TO
THE DISTRICT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

Taken to its logical, if absurd, extreme, the District's
"public duty" argument is, in essence, that a governmental
entity of the State of Utah can never be liable if it
negligently constructs or designs a road, if it negligently
maintains premises on which its business invitees are injured,
if its employees negligently operate automobiles or, as is the
case here, if its employees negligently fail to maintain a
motor vehicle.

The "public duty" cases cited by the District

involve situations gualitatively different from what is at
issue in this case.

The crux of the matter appears to be that

if a governmental entity acts in a negligent fashion or, as is
the case here, having acted in a negligent fashion, does
nothing to stop the consequences of what it has put into gear,
the "public duty" doctrine does not apply.

If this were a

case appropriately analyzed in a vacuum, and if the District
were correct in its argument that the Court's analysis should
begin only when Mr. Thomas came on the scene (and in ignorance
of what Ms. Benallie had put into gear by requesting
Mr. Thomas's co-worker to help her), then the "public duty"
analysis might make sense.

When, however, as is the case

here, and as recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provisions cited by Mr. Thomas in his Opening Brief at 11-12
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and in note 2, at 13-14 (the District has offered, in its
Brief, no response to these parts of Mr. Thomas's analysis),
the governmental entity's instrumentality is negligently
maintained and that negligence leads, as a matter of proximate
cause, to the sustaining of damages, the public duty analysis
simply does not apply.

It applies, as in the cases cited by

the District, if at all, only in situations in which there is,
as opposed to affirmative action by a governmental entity
(such as sending a poorly maintained vehicle out on the
highways, with a group of schoolchildren on board), only an
omission to act that is part of the relevant factual history.
D.

A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" EXISTED BETWEEN MR. THOMAS
AND THE DISTRICT, THROUGH ITS AGENT, MS. BENALLIE.

If, but only if, the Court is not persuaded by any of the
foregoing stand-alone arguments, that the District Court's
granting of summary judgment should be dismissed, the Court
needs to consider the "special relationship" aspect of this
case.

For the "special relationship" line of analysis to

apply, there must be no relevant antecedent action on the part
of the governmental entity employee.

If the Court accepts the

analysis set forth in the foregoing, Mr. Thomas contends, the
Court need not consider whether there was a "special
relationship" between Mr. Thomas and the District, through
Ms. Benallie.

6

Mr. Thomas contends that the Court should, in any event
and if it reaches that question in its deliberations regarding
this Appeal, conclude that there was, indeed, a "special
relationship'' between Mr. Thomas, on the one hand, and the
District, through its agent, Ms. Benallie, on the other hand.
For Ms. Benallie indirectly requested aid from Mr. Thomas when
she, according to record testimony, requested help from
Mr. Ebert, Mr. Thomas's co-worker.

See Mr. Ebert's Affidavit

at para. 3(R. at 256). The District stridently denies that
Ms. Benallie requested help from Mr. Thomas directly, and
Mr. Thomas does not contend to the contrary.

It is important

to realize, however, that Ms. Benallie's requesting help from
Mr. Ebert and standing by, at the scene, while Mr. Thomas
assisted with the operation and did essentially the same thing
that Mr. Ebert had been doing, right before Ms. Benallie's
eyes, was the functional equivalent of her having asked
Mr. Thomas for help.

One wonders what position the District

would take if it had been Mr. Ebert, the person to whom
Ms. Benallie made her direct request for help, rather than
Mr. Thomas, who was injured.

Mr. Thomas contends that it

makes no practical or legal difference, in these
circumstances, that Ms. Benallie had not directly requested
help from Mr. Thomas, and that Ms. Benallie, the agent of the

7

District, having taken action by affirmatively requesting
help, created a "special relationship" between the District
and Mr. Thomas.

For good legal and policy discussions

regarding the creation of "special relationships" in analogous
asking-for-assistance situations, see, e.g., Schuster v. City
of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958); Adamo v. P.G. Motor
Freight, Inc., 164 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. App. 1957); and Walker
v. County of Los Angeles, 238 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. App. 1987).
E.

MR. THOMAS'S CITING OF CASES FROM OTHER
JURISDICTIONS IS APPROPRIATE AND MAY BE
HELPFUL TO THE COURT'S DELIBERATIONS.

The District criticizes Mr. Thomas's analysis set forth
in Mr. Thomas's Opening Brief by reason of its relatively
limited discussion of Utah authorities and izs
authorities from other jurisdictions.

citing of

The fact of the matter

is that no Utah case appears to have dealt with the precise
issues presented by this Appeal.

General principles of Utah

law dealing with duty, negligence, and proximate cause are
discussed in the Utah cases cited in Mr. Thomas's Opening
Brief.

Cases from other jurisdictions cited in that Brief are

pertinent and appropriate for this Court's consideration.
F.

REPLY TO DISTRICT'S STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL
ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION

Mr. Thomas suggests, in reply to the District's statement
of belief that neither oral argument or published opinion is
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desirable, (1) that oral argument may be reasonably necessary
for full explanation of the relevant issues; and (2) that a
published opinion would be of assistance to the bench and bar
of the State.

Mr. Thomas will leave those things, however, to

the sound discretion of the Court, consistent with established
guidelines and practice.
III.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Mr. Thomas urges the Court to recognize that the District
owed him the duty of care, on one or more of several bases,
and likely all of them:

the general duty safely to maintain

its motor vehicles; the duty to him, as a member of a
foreseeable, finite, and small group of people who would
foreseeably be injured in the event of another "vapor lock"
incident; the duty to him in light of the knowledge of
Ms. Benallie, a District employee and agent, of what was
transpiring in her presence; and a duty based on the "special
relationship" established when Ms. Benallie asked for help and
did nothing while Mr. Thomas, assisting the assister, in
Ms. Benallie's presence, did something Ms. Benallie
acknowledged to be dangerous, on a District owned and
maintained vehicle.
Mr. Thomas urges the Court to reverse the grant of
summary judgment and remand this case for trial.
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Respectfully submitted this

J

day of October, 1999.

PETER C. COLLINS
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
ERIC P. SWENSON
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant, Everett Thomas
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